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T

he fundamental goal of food stamp fraud investigations without burdening
honest claimants should be to identify and punish people who have abused the
program. Failure to punish fraud wastes public funds and diminishes public
confidence in the program. However, intrusive investigations, harassment, disqualification, or prosecutions of innocent claimants undermine the program’s goals by
increasing stigma, discouraging eligible people from seeking aid, and reducing public confidence by creating the impression that fraud is more prevalent than it is.
Although the states’ performance varies widely, some states appear to engage in campaigns that are so aggressive and poorly targeted that they harm many innocent food
stamp claimants, who may sign agreements to be disqualified from benefits because
they believe that their only alternative is criminal prosecution or termination of their
entire household for noncooperation. This approach defeats the purpose of getting
food assistance to families in need.
The Food and Nutrition Service’s regulations offer the means to advocate reforming
these efforts. Moreover, its recent policy guidance provides for valuable tools for
advocating fairer procedures. In this article I propose four key principles that should
guide states’ antifraud efforts. Within each, I identify specific policies that advocates
might urge their states to adopt and suggest legal and policy arguments in support of
those policies.

I.

Determine that All Elements of an Intentional Program Violation Have
Occurred Before Taking Enforcement Action

Three elements are necessary to establish most types of intentional program violations (IPVs). First, except in trafficking cases, some event must occur, such as a new
job or new household member, which affects the household’s eligibility or benefit
level and which the food stamp office does not take into account. Second, there must
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be a violation of the program’s rules, typically a failure to report that event at or
between certifications. Third, the violation
must be intentional. Investigators who
ignore any one of these elements are likely
to accuse innocent households of IPVs.
Federal regulations require states to have
documentary evidence of an IPV before
seeking to punish a claimant.1 This
requirement is a basis for criticizing state
practices that fail to establish properly all
elements of an IPV and for advocating policies ensuring that only appropriate cases
are pursued for disqualification or criminal
prosecution.
A. Confirming the Underlying Facts

States receiving wage matches and other
information indicating a discrepancy in
circumstances affecting eligibility or
benefit levels must independently verify
that information before taking action
unless the information comes from one
of the few sources that are considered
“verified upon receipt.”2 This rule
applies in all cases, whether or not fraud
is suspected. The state agency should
send routine inquiries to employers in all
cases of wage matches on which the
agency decides to follow up for any reason.3 These requests for information
should not be identified as part of a fraud
investigation since that would disclose
confidential information and possibly
lead to incorrect and stigmatizing inferences—in violation of federal confidentiality and verification regulations.4

Some states average income from a wage
match over a quarter when an employer
fails to respond; this could result in inaccurate assessments.5 For example, all
quarterly earnings may have taken place
during a month before the household’s
application for benefits. Earnings from
late in the quarter may not have been
budgeted against the household because
of the “10-10-10” principle (or because
they were not sufficiently certain to be
received in the future to be anticipated
under the strict, recipient-friendly federal standards for income budgeting).6
Households subject to quarterly reporting, simplified reporting, or some other
systems may not be required to report the
income. Thus there may be no overissuance at all. Alternatively, if the earnings were concentrated in one month,
that month’s benefits might have been
inappropriate but the benefits for the
other two months correct, resulting in a
significantly smaller discrepancy than if
the earnings were spread so that all three
months’ benefits were erroneous. Also,
the earnings which could be from seasonal employment should be averaged
over a longer period. States’ management
evaluation reviews should include
assessments of the accuracy of policy
application by fraud investigation units.
Offering the household an opportunity to
respond to information received from
other sources is another way to ensure
that only appropriate cases are pursued
as IPVs. With identity theft becoming

17 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1) (2004).
2Id. § 273.2(f)(9)(v).
3Note that the 1996 welfare law gives states complete discretion regarding use of the Income and Eligibility Verification
System that gives much of the matching information available to states. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(18) (2000). States sought the
discretion to drop the system because many found that it too often contained erroneous or outdated matches. States
electing to continue using the system may disregard any matches that they do not believe merit follow-up.
47 C.F.R. §§ 272.1(c), 273.2(f)(4)(ii) (2004).
5Michigan Family Independence Agency Program Policy Bulletin 2003-001, page 10, attributes this policy to Food and
Nutrition Services advice.
6Under the “10-10-10” principle neither the state agency nor the household is liable for any overissuance of benefits
based on unreported information if the issuance takes place less than thirty days from the date of the event that the
household should have reported. This is because food stamp regulations give households ten days to make reports, the
state agency ten days to act on those reports, and the household at least ten days to respond to a notice of adverse action
before its benefits may be reduced. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(a)(2), (c)(2)(i) (2004). Thus, for any issuance made within thirty days
of a change, no one can be sure that the issuance would have been any different if the household and the state agency
had fully complied with their obligations under the regulations. The state agency may not be charged with a quality control error, and the household may not be charged with a claim, much less an intentional program violation (IPV). As for
receiving food stamps in the future, see id. § 273.10(c)(1).
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more widespread, employers may be
mistaken about workers’ true names and
social security numbers. Since federal
rules require states to have sufficient evidence to believe that an IPV has been
committed before taking action, state
food stamp agencies should make clear to
their staffs that sending confirming
notices to households is an important
part of verifying third-party information.7 Indeed, federal rules require states
to notify households when the states
receive unclear or uncertain information.8 These notices should clearly specify the dates of the alleged discrepant
information, the identities of any household members in question, and the
source and amount of any alleged unreported income or unjustified deductions.9 The notices should inform the
household that failure to respond would
not be held against it. And, of course,
notices should be written in plain, easyto-read terms and translated into appropriate languages to comply with states’
obligations under the due process clause
and federal rules.10
B. Determining Violations of Food
Stamp Regulations

A household that experiences a change
but reports it or is not required to report
it under program rules commits no violation at all, much less an intentional violation. The food stamp agency therefore
must determine that a household violated
program rules before the agency implements the IPV process.11 This involves
several steps.

First, fraud investigators should be
required to review the entire case file
before determining that no report was
made. Federal rules require a full review
by someone other than the eligibility
worker prior to the solicitation of a waiver of an administrative disqualification
hearing.12 By implication, the same
principle should apply to cases scheduled
for hearings and those referred for prosecution.13 If the eligibility worker sends
the fraud investigator only portions of a
case file, this independent review cannot
take place, and evidence that the household did report the change—a loose pay
stub, a phone message, or a note scrawled
on the case folder jacket itself—may be
overlooked. This particularly applies to
states with high turnover, where the eligibility worker referring a case may not
have handled it at the crucial juncture.
Full review of a case file that has been
purged is clearly impossible, as purged
items might have contained formal or
informal notations that the household
did report the circumstances in question.
Once a case file has been purged, the
state agency cannot possibly fulfill its
obligation to accused claimants to make
all relevant evidence available.14 Absent
specific state policies to the contrary,
local offices are free to purge documents
from case files after three years.15 States
should not pursue a matter as an IPV or a
household error claim if the case file has
become subject to purging under the
state’s document retention policy. States
also should protect files from future

7Id. § 273.16(a)(1).
8Id. § 273.12(c)(3); see also id. § 273.2(f)(9)(v).
9To facilitate meaningful responses, these notices should identify what would constitute relevant, and irrelevant, responses. E.g., the response would be relevant if the claimant did not work for the employer named, did work for the employer but not during the months specified, or tried to report that information to the eligibility worker; on the other hand,
what would not be relevant is that the household could not afford to have its food stamps reduced.
10Id. § 272.4(b); see, e.g., Santiago v. D’Elia, 435 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 1981) (disallowing recoupment of overpayment
where there was “no indication whatsoever that the Spanish-speaking petitioner understood the English acknowledgment that she signed”).
117 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1) (2004).
12Id. § 273.16(f)(1).
13See id. § 273.16(a)(1), (f)(1).
14See id. §§ 273.16(e)(3)(iii)(C), (G), 273.15(p)(1).
15Id. § 272.1(f).
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purging where a possible claim or IPV is procedures that state agency personnel
believe—probably with good reason—to
being investigated.
be advisable should not be equated with
Fraud investigators should consider violations of specific program rules.
whether the income or resources in Recipients who follow poor security
question might be excluded or was not practices may lose benefits (a not
reasonably certain to be received (and insignificant penalty for someone poor
hence could not have been anticipated) enough to qualify for food stamps), but,
and whether a report of the income might absent a clear rule that prohibits their
not have been required (or, if it was, specific conduct and has been clearly
whether the report was due) under the explained, recipients should not be disreporting policy applicable to the house- qualified for IPVs. Moreover, even where
hold for the relevant month.16 Neither food stamps have been trafficked, the
should IPVs be founded on unusual or Food and Nutrition Service emphasizes
even foolish uses of benefits or electron- that “the head of household may not be
ic benefit transfer cards (such as giving held ‘automatically’ responsible for traffood to a friend, writing a personal iden- ficking the household’s benefits if there
tification number on a card, or giving a is no direct evidence identifying him/her
card to a friend to purchase food for the as the guilty party.”20
household) unless the program’s regulations clearly prohibit those uses and the In cases of suspected trafficking, deterprohibitions are carefully explained to mining whether the program’s rules have
claimants. For example, federal rules been violated is even more difficult. A
permit the household to allow any non- quirky pattern of purchases could mean
household member to purchase food with nothing more than that, even if the patthe household’s benefits; the household tern takes place at a store that is later disneed not go through any particular pro- qualified for trafficking. Typically, even
cedure to do so.17 Similarly, although at dishonest stores, most customers are
federal rules require states to train honest and likely oblivious of what may
households about electronic benefits be going on in the backroom.21 Unusual
transfer security procedures, they do not purchases also could mean that the
impose requirements upon house- claimant’s card and PIN (personal idenholds.18 And, although those rules tification number) were stolen and
impose a general requirement on state abused by someone in or out of the food
agencies, issuers, and retailers to take store. In negotiating arrangements with
steps to prevent improper use of food the Food and Nutrition Service under
stamp benefits, they do not impose any which the agency will follow up on possispecific requirements on recipients— ble trafficking that Alert, its automated
who can hardly be expected to be security system, identifies, states should ensure
specialists—relating to the handling of that “hits” have been screened carefully
these benefits.19 Violations of security enough to limit fraud accusations to

16See id. §§ 273.8(e), 273.9(c) (excludable income or resources), 273.10(c)(1) (unanticipated income or resources),
273.12(a) (reporting policy).
17Id. § 273.2(n)(3).
18Id. § 274.12(g)(10)(iv).
19Id. § 271.5(c).
20LOU PASTURA, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, FSP—REVISITING POLICY REGARDING HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AS INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR
INTENTIONAL PROGRAM VIOLATIONS (IPV) (2001), available at www.fns.gov/fsp/rules/Memo/04/fraud_ipv.htm. The Food and
Nutrition Service does note, however, that the head of household may be charged if the state has sufficient evidence to
prove, with regard to the IPV, that “he/she was aware of it, may have benefited from it, and took no actions to correct
it.” Id.
21In guidance in 2004 the Food and Nutrition Service acknowledged that patterns of suspicious activity often fall short
of actionable proof of IPVs. BARBARA HALLMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FRAUD POLICY: 7 CFR 273.16, at 1 (Feb. 4,
2004) [hereinafter FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO], available at www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/rules/Memo/04/fraud_policy.htm.
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tion through key entries when swiping an
electronic benefits transfer card fails, or
through manual vouchers, often indicates that someone was seeking to access
an account with the correct numbers but
without an authentic electronic benefits
transfer card. Alert should have this
information or be able to retrieve it from
system records. The information should
be relied upon to eliminate potential IPV
cases unless other evidence strongly sugSince trafficking is impossible without the gests the household’s involvement in
collaboration of a corrupt retailer, limiting fraud.
attention to households engaging in suspicious patterns of benefit usage at retailers C. Determining Whether Any
that have been found to have trafficked can
Violation Is Intentional
be a more reliable means of identifying
fraud. Current agency practice focuses on The most difficult and error-prone element
households that shop at stores that are sus- of establishing an IPV is intent. A system
pected of trafficking and that have not been that finds claimants guilty of IPVs only when
adjudicated to be guilty of actual IPVs. they make explicit, written confessions is
Whether the store owners have an innocent vulnerable to abuse by unscrupulous
explanation of their suspicious conduct is claimants—and gives investigators strong
impossible to know without a criminal or incentives to coerce confessions from
administrative adjudication. An adjudica- claimants who may not be guilty. At the
tion also would allow determination of the other extreme, a system that presumes
period during which a store was trafficking. intent based solely on a claimant’s signature
To accuse recipients of trafficking at a store on an application or other program documakes no sense if the trafficking was the ment that includes boilerplate language
work of a single employee and if the recipi- about reporting amid a host of other cauents’ patterns of usage were the same tions and advisories can ensnare numerous
before, during, and after that employee’s innocent claimants with limited literacy as
tenure. Similarly, if the guilty employee well as those who failed to read the docuworked the day shift, recipients who ment carefully during a tense or hurried
shopped at night should not be accused of interview. A sensible middle ground is
trafficking. States should pursue Alert needed.
referrals only where households shopped in 1. Case File Reviews
suspicious patterns at stores that have been Evidence of the claimant’s intent (or lack
administratively or criminally found guilty thereof) can often be found in the case
of trafficking. States should apply as much file.
information as possible about the patterns
of trafficking at convicted stores to deter- Claimant’s Reporting History. A
mine which subset of recipients with claimant who was not given the change
unusual shopping patterns at that store are report form may be less likely to understand the need to submit a report. A
likely to have trafficked.
claimant with a solid record of reporting
Before accusing households of fraud, changes is more likely to have forgotten
investigators should be required to check or given up after unsuccessful efforts to
for indications that third parties have reach the eligibility worker. A claimant
accessed the recipient’s account inap- who failed to respond to written notices
propriately. For example, benefit utiliza- in the past when doing so would have
households that are very likely to have
abused the program.22 Data on the
household alone rarely will be sufficient
to show an IPV because relatively few
transactions are involved and because
unsophisticated households that are
uncomfortable with electronic benefits
transfer may adopt a variety of coping
mechanisms that appear anomalous
when viewed out of context.

22Alert is the Food and Nutrition Service’s automated system for monitoring the millions of food stamp electronic benefits transfer transactions for suspicious patterns. The acronym is for Antifraud Locator using EBT (electronic benefits transfer) Retail Transactions. Many potentially innocent events—evening transactions at stores thought to be open only during the day, transactions in even numbers of dollars, large transactions at small stores, transactions at stores that are
suspected of wrongdoing—can contribute to a case being flagged as suspicious.
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been advantageous may have a literacy
problems that prevented understanding
instructions or declarations on the application form or in other program information. A claimant with a documented
history of being subjected to domestic
violence is more likely to have had her
electronic benefits transfer card taken
from her and used improperly by her
abuser (and to have been coerced into
supplying her identification number).
Eligibility Worker’s Documentation
History. The case file (or the experience of
supervisors) also may disclose that the eligibility worker poorly documents contacts
with the claimant. If the file includes no
record of contacts that clearly took place
(as evidenced by subsequent actions in the
case), the absence of a record of a report of
a change should not be relied upon as
proof that none was made—much less that
the claimant intentionally withheld information. Similarly, if an eligibility worker
was found in prior cases to have told recipients not to bother reporting information
until their next recertification, the state
should not assume that the worker gave a
claimant accurate information about disclosure obligations. Cases involving an
eligibility worker who has been responsible for prior “failure to act” errors should
be examined closely.
Records of Phone Calls. Many claimants
lack home telephones and make their
calls from pay phones, friends’ houses,
and borrowed cell phones that are difficult to trace. In some cases, however, the
local telephone company can produce
records of local calls made from a particular telephone. States alleging IPVs
should offer to request local phone company records to show attempts to report
changes if a claimant asserts having tried
unsuccessfully to reach the eligibility
worker through an identifiable telephone
account. States should offer to request
telephone company records to support
claimants’ assertions that they attempted
to report changes and should retain telephone message records in such a way that

the records can be checked when
claimants assert attempts to reach their
eligibility worker.23 This should be done
particularly in areas with high turnover
and those where eligibility workers’ caseloads routinely prevent them from
returning or responding to all calls.
Inculpatory Behavior. Claimants who
lied to avoid having certification interviews scheduled during the hours of a job
that they failed to report demonstrate an
intent to deceive. A claimant who misled
the state agency about one issue is more
likely to have deceived it about others.
Doctored social security cards, thirdparty verification letters, or other documents that a claimant submitted in the
past can support inference of a current
intent to deceive even if those documents
have no direct bearing on the current
problem. States should target the
strongest cases: those with documentary
evidence of a pattern of dishonest acts.
Evidence of Language Barriers or
Mental Disabilities. A few case files may
raise such serious questions about intent
that proceeding to treat the case as an IPV
would be unreasonable. A claimant identified as having limited English proficiency should not be presumed to have
understood declarations or instructions
not given in the appropriate language.
Even if the eligibility worker used as a
translator a friend or relative of the
claimant, or spoke to the claimant with
the help of a telephone translator not
familiar with food stamp rules, the eligibility worker may not have sufficient
basis to be sure that the claimant understood exactly what the program’s rules
required. The Food and Nutrition Service
notes that “some mentally disabled individuals may lack the ability to form the
intent necessary for establishing an
IPV.”24 File notations that an individual
receives social security, Supplemental
Security Income, or other disability benefits should alert eligibility workers and
fraud investigators to the need to determine whether the individual is capable of

23States should retain telephone messages and copies or logs of voicemail messages under the record retention policy of
7 C.F.R. § 272.1(f) and make that information available to accused claimants under 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(3)(iii)(C).
24FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO, supra note 21, at 3.
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forming an intent to defraud the program.
An approach that tends to presume an
intentional act when a claimant with a mental disability fails to comply with administrative requirements can have, in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
effect of discriminating against persons
with disabilities. States should advise their
fraud investigators that to charge claimants
with IPVs where important information was
delivered in an inappropriate language or
where the claimant has a documented serious mental disability that may have caused
the incident in question would be inconsistent with the Food Stamp Act’s requirement
of “accurate and fair service,” the federal
regulations’ requirements of intent, and
Title VI and the Americans with Disabilities
Act.25 Where a state is contemplating
charging a disability benefit recipient with
an IPV, the fraud investigator should seek to
determine whether a mental impairment is
part of the identified disability, whether the
accused claimant has been exempted from
food stamp work requirements on the basis
of at least a partially mental incapacity, or
whether the state’s Medicaid records show
that the claimant is receiving medications
consistent with the presence of a mental
impairment.
Reliance on Overissuance as Evidence
of Intent. Officials in some states
describe policies of automatically considering overissuances that exceed an
arbitrary threshold to be IPVs. Federal
regulations, however, permit state agencies to rely on such thresholds only when
deciding which of the cases already
determined to be IPVs to refer for prosecution.26 These regulations do not
authorize states to dispense altogether
with determinations of intent in cases
over a certain threshold amount.
2. Review of Electronic
Benefit Transactions

Many Food and Nutrition Service rules for
using electronic benefits transfer cards

may be counterintuitive to claimants. For
example, a claimant may not see anything
wrong with making a food purchase in
which the stores provide the food late in
one month, when the household is in distress, and accepts payment early the following month, after benefits are issued.
The prohibition on credit transactions and
other usage rules should be explained in
electronic benefits transfer training.
States often do not specifically require
clear coverage of these matters in training
sessions. Many states also now “train by
mail,” sending recipients brochures
rather than actually training them in benefit usage. Some recipients may be unable
to read or understand these prohibitions;
others may fail to grasp their significance
and forget them. States should not assume
an intentional violation of the program’s
rules in electronic benefits transfer transactions that do not involve dishonesty
unless the state has direct evidence that
the prohibition in question was explained
to the recipients. A recipient who has been
warned once about credit transactions
may be charged with any subsequent
occurrence of prohibited conduct.
In some cases Alert may show a pattern of
transactions sufficiently suspicious to
convince fraud investigators that an IPV
has taken place. Who engaged in the prohibited transactions may not be clear if
the household has more than one member. Some states simply assume that the
head of the household is responsible and
should be disqualified. This presumption
has no basis in the statute and regulations
and may often be false. Indeed, the head
of the household may feel more responsibility for the household’s well-being,
and less inclined to traffic than a young
adult or extended family household
member. The head of the household certainly is likely to be more concerned
about preserving the household’s future
eligibility than a boyfriend, neighbor, or

257 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B) (2000) (“accurate and fair service”); 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1), (c), (e)(6), (f)(1)(i) (2004) (intent);
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); see 7 C.F.R. pt. 15 (2004) (Title VI requirements for U.S. Department of Agriculture programs)
and id. § 272.4(b) (Food Stamp Program requirements for serving people with limited English proficiency); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2000) (Americans with Disabilities Act). Regarding language access, see also Mary Ellen Natale & David A. Super,
Securing Access to the Food Stamp Program for the Non-English-Speaking Poor, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 954 (Dec. 1989).
267 C.F.R. § 273.16(g)(1) (2004).
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babysitter to whom a household member II. Keep Each Stage of the
Process Separate
entrusts an electronic benefits transfer
card and PIN when the household memCriminal prosecution, administrative
ber is unable to go to the store.
disqualification hearings, and waiver and
Some food stamp recipients may be consent forms all are integral parts of the
unaware that they have been made vic- system that punishes claimants for abustims of trafficking by those to whom they ing the Food Stamp Program. Each has its
entrusted their cards. Unlike credit own strengths and weaknesses, and each
cards, electronic benefit transfer cards is appropriate only to certain types of sitgenerate no monthly statements that uations. The regulations give states sigwould allow claimants to see where their nificant discretion to determine which
benefits were spent. Recipients juggling approach is most appropriate in each
work, child care, and other responsibili- case. Those regulations do, however,
ties may be unable to find transaction require states to choose among these
receipts and to track the balances in their tools; states may not combine the various
electronic benefits transfer accounts. techniques in a single case to overwhelm
Many, too, have arithmetic or reading a claimant. Proper application of these
skills so limited that they cannot under- regulations that distinguish the various
stand and draw conclusions from any enforcement devices can greatly enhance
the fairness and accuracy of states’
transaction receipts available.
antifraud systems.
Moreover, recipients realizing that they
have been the victims of trafficking may A. The Decision to Refer a Case
for Prosecution or Pursue It
not report the incidents for any of severAdministratively
al reasons that have nothing to do with
fraud. Some may simply see no point in
Serious abuses in some states’ IPV invesreporting trafficking since the program
tigations result from threats of prosecuwill not replace the benefits. Indeed, for
tion. Making such threats to win concesthis reason some may prefer to confront
sions in a civil dispute, even where a
the trafficker themselves to obtain some
crime actually occurred, is unfair and
food to compensate them for their loss,
may be extortionate. On a number of
not realizing that the Food and Nutrition
occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court found
Service considers the program, together
constitutional violations when the govwith the household, to be a trafficking
ernment tried to “whipsaw” accused
victim. Some may see no point in reportindividuals between threats of criminal
ing trafficking after they resolve to preprosecution and loss of public benefits or
vent a recurrence by not entrusting their
employment.27 Ethical rules governing
card to the offender again. Some may
attorneys (including those in prosecubelieve that reporting the trafficking will
tors’ offices) prohibit threats of prosecumean that they must take time off from
tion to gain advantage in civil disputes, as
work to wait in line at the food stamp
do many states’ fair debt collection pracoffice and that their household will be
tices statutes. The risk of abuse is exacerwithout benefits during a lengthy investibated where the accused has no viable
gation. And some may try to contact the
opportunity to consult counsel since
food stamp office but cannot get through
none is appointed before criminal
to the appropriate caseworker. States
charges are brought but civil legal servicshould train their fraud investigators to
es are not available. The Food and
recognize that some recipients who
Nutrition Service notes that
appear to be perpetrators of food stamp
trafficking may be its victims.
suggesting to the client that
his/her case may be referred for
27See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick,
392 U.S. 273 (1968); Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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prosecution if he/she does not
sign an [administrative disqualification hearing] waiver is confusing or misleading and again
makes it difficult for the individual to make an informed decision. Additionally, the consequences of losing a judicial
proceeding are potentially so
severe when contrasted with
“merely” losing one’s benefits
for 12 months, that it is conceivable that innocent clients will
sign [administrative disqualification hearing] waivers rather
than risk the alternative.28
This doubtlessly leads to numerous erroneous disqualifications by coerced consent. Both federal regulations and recent
U.S. Department of Agriculture guidance, however, direct that the decision
whether to prosecute or proceed administratively be made at the beginning of a
case:29
The State agency must not offer
an [administrative disqualification hearing] waiver if it intends
to refer the case for prosecution
nor suggest prosecution if the
waiver is not signed. If an
[administrative disqualification
hearing] waiver is offered, it
should be because the State
agency has already determined
that an administrative hearing is
appropriate in this case....
[T]hese provisions require the
State agency to make a determination as to which procedure,
administrative or judicial, it
believes appropriate for a given
case and to pursue that procedure to its conclusion. Thus,
whenever State agencies have
sufficient evidence to hold a

hearing and have offered an
[administrative disqualification
hearing] waiver to the individual, an [administrative disqualification hearing] and not a
referral for prosecution is the
appropriate course of action.30
Indeed, obtaining a waiver through
threats of prosecution may deny the
accused due process of law. A waiver cannot be knowing or intelligent unless the
individual is informed that an IPV hearing is one consequence of not signing. To
this end, federal rules require that states
describe the administrative disqualification hearing process and the penalty that
can result when soliciting waivers.31
However, “[o]ffering an [administrative
disqualification hearing] waiver accompanied by the required notices appropriate to the administrative proceeding does
not properly inform the individual of the
consequences of not signing the waiver if
he or she is to be referred for prosecution.”32
States should recognize that federal regulations do not permit threats of criminal
prosecution to be employed in the
administrative process or concurrent
with requests for administrative waivers.
States should remind their staffs that
federal financial participation is available for work on cases being referred for
prosecution only for activities necessary
to the prosecution, such as organizing
evidence, briefing the prosecutor, and
testifying at a trial, and not for activities
inconsistent with the decision to prosecute, such as requesting waivers.
B. Delaying Waiver Requests Until
the Investigation Is Complete

Some states combine the notice of the
apparent discrepancy with a request that
the household sign a waiver or acknowl-

28FNS 2004 FRAUD Memo, supra note 21, at 2.
297 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1) (2004); FNS 2004 FRAUD Memo, supra note 21, at 1–2.
30FNS 2004 FRAUD Memo, supra note 21, at 2; see 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(f)(1) (2004).
317 C.F.R. § 273.16(f)(1) (2004); FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO, supra note 21, at 2.
32FNS 21004 FRAUD MEMO, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis supplied). The Food and Nutrition Service goes on to note that
confusion about the consequences of each course of action could make a decision different from what they would be if
fully informed.
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edgment of an IPV. Inherently intimidating, the combined letters are unlikely to
elicit informative responses to the notice of
the discrepancy even if the state’s information is demonstrably erroneous. A claimant
who infers that the state already has determined guilt of fraud—as the request for a
waiver implies—may feel that any explanation is too late to be taken seriously.
Alternatively the claimant may fail to
appreciate the consequences of a waiver
and believe that signing it is merely responsive to the request for information. Also, as
a practical matter, once fraud investigators
send a letter accusing a claimant of an IPV
and demanding that the claimant sign a
waiver, the investigators’ position has likely
hardened to the point that the investigators
are no longer open to any but the most overwhelming defenses.

administrative disqualification hearings
and another, lower, standard for claimants
whom the states will ask to sign hearing
waivers. Thus, for example, a state might
schedule hearings only for overissuances
exceeding $1,000 but send letters demanding hearing waivers in all cases of overissuances that exceed $500. Alternatively a
state might schedule a hearing only where it
has proof of the claimant’s intent to violate
program rules but solicit waivers in all cases
of overissuances over a certain amount.
Presumably, in cases that do not meet the
threshold for scheduling a hearing, the state
drops the case as an IPV and merely
processes it as an inadvertent household
error or agency error claim if the claimant
does not sign the waiver. Because sending
standardized letters asking claimants to
sign waivers is so much easier than proving
a case at a hearing, this practice is likely to
lead to meritless allegations against innocent claimants, some of whom nonetheless
will sign waivers out of fear or confusion.
Federal rules and Food and Nutrition
Service guidance prohibit states from soliciting waivers unless they have first obtained
an independent determination that the case
is strong enough to merit scheduling a
hearing.36 The agency instructs states that
they should invite an individual to sign a
waiver only when they will schedule a hearing if the individual does not sign.37

This practice violates federal rules
because, by soliciting more information
from the claimant, the state implicitly
acknowledges that it is still gathering data
and has not definitely decided that the
case warrants scheduling an administrative disqualification hearing.33 This
practice, because it is so likely to mislead
or confuse innocent claimants into signing away their right to receive food
stamps, also violates the Food Stamp
Act’s “accurate and fair service” requirement.34 In 2004 the Food and Nutrition
Service advised states that “[w]aivers D. Delaying Requests for “Consents
should not be offered when there is a susto Disqualification” Until a
picion of guilt but the evidence is not
Criminal Case Is Resolved
convincing.”35
Although similar in effect, “consents to disC. Delaying Waiver Requests Until
qualifications” and “waivers of administrathe Case Is Ready for a Hearing
tive disqualification hearings” are under
separate sections of the federal regulations
Some states reportedly have one threshold and authorized under very different cirfor cases for which they will schedule

33See id. § 273.16(f)(1)(i).
347 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
35FNS 2004 FRAUD Memo, supra note 21, at 1, illustrates this point forcefully: E.g., an investigator having reviewed an
individual’s EBT transactions in a store previously disqualified for trafficking, might believe, based on these transactions,
that the individual has committed an IPV. However, unless the investigator is willing to take this evidence before a hearing official, an administrative disqualification hearing waiver should not be offered.
36Id.; 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(f)(1)(i) (2004).
37FNS 2004 FRAUD Memo, supra note 21, at 1.
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cumstances.38 Federal regulations allow
states to request consents to disqualification only after a case is resolved through
“deferred adjudication.” Only at this point
have the prosecutor, the defense counsel,
and the judge had the opportunity to consider the merits of the case: the prosecutor
having determined that the case was worth
prosecuting and the defense counsel having
had the opportunity to demand that the case
be dismissed as frivolous. Because both will
have already been involved by the time a
case reaches deferred adjudication, the
rules on consent to disqualification (unlike
those on administrative disqualification
hearing waivers) do not require prior independent review of the merits and a notice
explaining the charges and the claimant’s
right to defend.39 If states can threaten
criminal prosecution to obtain consent to
disqualification before the accused
claimant has had the opportunity to have a
criminal defense lawyer appointed, all of
the safeguards of the regulations on waivers
of administrative disqualification hearings
are rendered meaningless.40 Innocent
claimants can be pressed to agree to disqualification for events which are not properly ascribed to them and for which they
may have compelling explanations. States
should clarify that federal regulations permit fraud investigators to seek consents to
disqualification only when a case is brought
to court and the court enters a judgment of
deferred adjudication.
III. Avoid Coerced Concessions

Waivers or confessions signed under
coercion are not reliable indications of
guilt. To the extent that innocent
claimants are disqualified in this manner, the program’s goals of fighting food
insecurity are undermined, its statutory

principle of “accurate and fair service” is
disregarded, and its messages about the
importance of honest dealing with state
agencies become blurred. Consistent
with the Food Stamp Act’s guarantee of
“accurate and fair service” as well as federal regulations, states choosing to solicit waivers of administrative disqualification hearings should do so only through
the mail, not in meetings with fraud
investigators or eligibility workers.
A. Preventing Unauthorized
Demands on Claimants

Federal regulations strictly limit when
households may be required to appear for
interviews, and responding to a fraud
investigator’s questions is not one of these
instances. A letter from the food stamp
office asking a recipient to appear for a
meeting implicitly threatens to terminate
benefits if the recipient does not comply—
particularly in a program (such as food
stamps) requiring frequent face-to-face
interviews to continue benefits. This is
effectively an unauthorized additional
condition of eligibility in violation of the
Food Stamp Act and its implementing regulations.41 The U.S. Department of
Agriculture confirmed this interpretation
in a 2003 memo.42
In practice, these interviews often prove
highly coercive. Consider a claimant who
lacks a complete knowledge of the program’s rules and is questioned about
their violation by investigators who know
the rules. The claimant may feel the need
to satisfy the investigators to avoid termination of benefits for the entire household or a criminal charge. Food stamp
offices cultivate a culture in which
claimants believe they must sign any
form placed in front of them in order to

38Compare 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(f) (providing for waivers of administrative disqualification hearings by persons whom the
state agency is trying to disqualify through an administrative hearing) with id. § 273.16(h) (authorizing state to seek consents to disqualification from persons against whom prosecutors brought charges but whose criminal cases ended with
a court order of “deferred adjudication”).
39Id. § 273.16(h)(1).
40Id. § 273.16(f)(1).
417 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2020(e)(5) (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(1) (2004).
42Arthur T. Foley & Lou Pastura, Food Stamp Program Cooperation with Fraud Investigators (April 24, 2003), available at
www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/rules/Memo/03/fraud.htm.
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receive essential benefits, despite uncertainty about the consequences. In other
contexts, failure to sign a paper presented by the food stamp agency means that
the entire household is denied food
stamps until the claimant relents and
signs. Many papers that food stamp
offices ask claimants to sign are mere
acknowledgments of decisions already
taken by the state agency or ordained by
the program’s rules.43
With few cues that different rules apply in
fraud investigators, an accused claimant
may believe that disqualification has
already been decided upon and that failure to sign would leave other household
members without food stamps. Some
fraud investigators reportedly tell
claimants that signing the waiver will
allow their children to continue receiving
food stamps—misleadingly implying that
refusal to sign will cause the children to
be cut off.
Some state agencies may demand that
claimants appear for meetings with fraud
investigators in the hope of getting
admissions of guilt. Important as it is to
determine claimants’ intent in these
cases, meetings with fraud investigators
are unlikely to be much help in doing so.
Indeed, claimants so unsophisticated as
to capitulate in the face of investigators’
pressure may be less likely to have the
guile to defraud the program than those
who defiantly stand their ground. The
Food and Nutrition Service reports with
approval that some state agencies recognize this problem and either instruct
their fraud investigators to accept
waivers only by mail rather than at interviews or allow accused individuals to
withdraw waivers signed at meetings with
investigators.44
B. Ensuring that Claimants Fully
Understand the Consequences of
Signing a Waiver

Waivers of administrative disqualification

hearings can save both state agencies and
claimants time and effort where the
claimant committed an IPV. In these cases,
waivers serve the program’s interests.
Waivers that innocent claimants sign out of
confusion or fear, however, undermine the
program’s effectiveness in fighting food
insecurity. They also undermine the credibility of the program’s antifraud message,
which should seek to draw a sharp line
between the treatment of those who have
committed fraud and those who have not. If
the disqualification and claim appear to
spring from being misled by the state’s
efforts to solicit the waiver rather than from
an act of fraud, the message to other
claimants will be to distrust the state (which
may even lead to more IPVs) rather than to
be more candid. A state that seeks to discourage tricky behavior in claimants should
not be engaging in tricky behavior itself.
The Food and Nutrition Service recognizes
this problem: “For individuals to make an
informed decision with respect to waiving
the right to a hearing, they must be fully
informed of due process rights, hearing
procedures, and consequences they face if
determined guilty of an IPV at the hearing.”45
Some states’ letters soliciting waivers of
administrative disqualification hearings
are written so cryptically that accused
claimants may not have any clear idea of
what they are signing. Particularly problematic are letters that make the waiver
seem like routine paperwork that needs
to be signed and returned for the
claimant to continue receiving food
stamps. The Food and Nutrition Service
recognizes the potential for confusion
and suggests
includ[ing] a statement on the
[administrative disqualification
hearing] waiver form that would
allow the individual to assert that
they do not wish to waive their
right to an administrative hearing. For example, such a state-

43E.g., although the claimant is required to acknowledge by signing the application form that information that the
claimant supplies is subject to third-party verification, 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(b)(1)(i) (2004), the verification that actually takes
place is not the result of the claimant’s acknowledgment but rather the federal regulations. Id. § 273.2(f).
44FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO, supra note 21, at 3.
45Id. at 2.
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ment might read, “I have read
this notice and wish to exercise
my right to have an administrative hearing.” Current regulations at 7 CFR 273.16(f)(1)(ii)(D)
require that the individual be
permitted to indicate on the
waiver form whether they agree
or disagree with the facts of the
case as presented. Some clients
may wrongly conclude that they
should sign the waiver to disagree with the facts as presented
and exercise their right to have a
hearing. We believe the inclusion of this additional statement
will allow the individual to sign
the waiver form while affirmatively asserting his or her desire
to have a hearing.46

was presented in such a way as to be confusing to the client. Omission of due
process rights and other information
from the waiver form not only fails to
provide the individual information to
make a decision about signing the waiver;
it may also jeopardize the State agency’s
case.”47 The Food and Nutrition Service
also notes that

Some claimants may think they are
acknowledging that an overissuance
occurred but not realize they are accepting an individual disqualification. Others
may believe that they are agreeing not to
receive food stamps for a year but not
understand that a large claim will be collected from other household members’
benefits or recouped from one or more
household members’ earned income tax
credits or other tax refunds. Often the
relevant information appears somewhere
in the documents presented to the
claimant, but many food stamp claimants
have limited literacy skills. Even those
who read well may not work through the
fine print of the waiver if they are misled
by the reassuring language in the solicitation letter or frightened by overt or
implied threats of what might happen if
they do not sign.

clients unfamiliar with administrative hearings may confuse the
[administrative disqualification
hearing] with a court proceeding
and may wrongly believe that the
consequence of a hearing is
essentially the same as that of a
conviction in court. Thus, individuals may believe the waiver is
a way of avoiding a more serious
penalty they might be subject to
were they to go ahead with the
hearing. Adding a statement to
the waiver form indicating that
the penalty remains the same
whether the individual chooses
to have a hearing and is determined guilty, or whether the
individual waives the hearing,
might permit a more objective
consideration of the merits of
agreeing to the waiver versus
having an administrative hearing.48

Several different federal regulations
contain requirements for information
that must be on waiver forms.49 Notices
that do not plainly and openly disclose
their purpose, and the consequence of
signing waivers, fall short of providing
the “fair service” that the Food Stamp Act
requires.50 States should have their
The Food and Nutrition Service reports waiver and waiver solicitation forms
that its “reviews showed that important reviewed by literacy experts to ensure the
information was sometimes omitted or forms’ accessibility to as large a propor-

46Id.
47Id. at 2.
48Id. at 3.
49The main regulation on waivers, 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(f)(1) (2004), contains several requirements of its own and cross-references id. § 273.16(e)(3), which adds more requirements and, in turn, requires a description of all of the rights set out
at id. § 273.15(p). The Food and Nutrition Service sent states a list of these requirements. FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO, supra
note 21 (appendix).
507 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
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tion of the food stamp caseload as possible. States also should translate these
documents into the appropriate languages for households not proficient in
English.
An accused claimant who understands
the consequences of signing the waiver
still may not understand the consequences of not signing. The claimant may
feel compelled to sign because the consequence of not signing would be disqualification of the entire household for noncooperation. These claimants may reason
that having some food stamps continue
for other household members is better
than having the entire household cut off—
especially if the claimants believe that
they will have to sign the waiver eventually for any benefits to be reinstated. States
should further instruct their staffs not to
solicit waivers of administrative disqualification hearings without making clear
that the only consequence of failing to
sign will be the scheduling of an administrative disqualification hearing at
which the state will have to prove its case
and in which the most severe consequence would be identical to the consequence of signing the waiver.
Some claimants may be unable to comprehend a letter soliciting a waiver, or the
waiver itself, because of language difficulties or a mental disability. The Food and
Nutrition Service warns that “all forms
used by the State agency to advise individuals about the investigation due process
rights and hearing procedures should be
simply stated and in a manner that is clear
and understandable to clients.”51 It
specifically notes that “some mentally disabled individuals ... may not fully understand the consequences of signing an
[administrative disqualification hearing]
waiver” and urges states to schedule hearings for these individuals without seeking
“questionable” waivers.52 Disqualifying

claimants on the basis of waivers they do
not understand probably violates the due
process clause.53 In violation of Title VI,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
the Food Stamp Act’s requirement of
“accurate and fair service,” it also has the
effect of denying benefits to otherwise eligible claimants because of their disabilities. States should determine whether a
mental impairment is part of the basis for
any disability for which a claimant receives
cash or health care benefits, forms the
basis for exempting a claimant from work
requirements, or may be indicated by prescriptions filled through the state’s
Medicaid program; unless the state can
rule out any mental impairment in these
cases, it should not solicit waivers.
C. Not Relying on the Availability
of Legal Services for
Accused Claimants

Our society tolerates intense and sometimes coercive police questioning in criminal matters because suspects have the
right to request and receive free counsel.
Because the right to free legal representation does not apply at all in civil cases, or
in criminal cases until an arrest is made, a
similar safeguard is not available in food
stamp IPV cases. Many, if not most, legal
aid programs do not take food stamp IPV
cases at all, and many of the rest take only
a small fraction of those that occur.
Abusive and coercive interviews are likely
to produce incorrect confessions and disqualifications and thus violate the Food
Stamp Act’s requirement of “accurate and
fair service,” but they cannot meaningfully
be controlled by telling people of a right to
counsel that is likely to be largely illusory.
The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) Act
prohibits LSC-funded programs from
becoming involved in criminal matters.54 When states send claimants
notices on prosecutors’ letterhead or

51FNS 2004 FRAUD MEMO, supra note 24, at 2.
52Id. at 3.
53See, e.g., Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1991) (failure to meet deadline may not be held against claimant
with severe mental disability); Young v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); Elchediak v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 892
(11th Cir. 1985) (same); Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1981) (same); Torres v. Secretary, 475 F.2d 466
(1st Cir. 1973) (same).
54See 45 C.F.R. § 1613.3 (2004) (enforcing prohibition).
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other notices threatening criminal prosecution, these programs may feel that they
may not take the case (or that taking it would
be futile since it apparently is on the brink
of becoming criminal). As noted above,
legal representation will never be available
to the vast majority of claimants investigated for IPVs. Nonetheless, when a state
makes its administrative pursuit of an IPV
appear to be the prelude to a “criminal”
proceeding, the state effectively prevents
the claimant from obtaining counsel even
where it might otherwise be available. This
is inconsistent with the state’s obligation to
inform accused claimants of their right to
legal counsel and is one more reason for
states to follow carefully the regulations’
requirement to determine early in the
process whether a case will be referred for
prosecution or pursued administratively.55
States should advise their staffs that using
letterhead from criminal justice agencies or
threatening criminal action while seeking
information or waivers in an administrative
matter is inconsistent with federal regulations.56
IV. Correct Questionable
State Fiscal Practices

The ferocity of some states’ antifraud
efforts puzzles some advocates because
states do not pay any of the costs of food
stamp benefits.57 Moreover, states
receive no credit against their quality
control error rates when the recipient of
an overissuance is prosecuted or disqualified.58 Part of the explanation, of
course, is that food stamp fraud is illegal
and hence inherently offensive. Another
part is a combination of history and
finances. For more than a decade before
1993, states received a 75 percent federal
match for money spent on antifraud
activities. This encouraged some to build
large antifraud units, many of which have
proven effective at lobbying for contin-

ued funding even after the federal match
rate was reduced to the same 50 percent
that other activities receive.59 States
retain 35 percent of overissuances collected from households where someone
was disqualified for an IPV, but only 10
percent for inadvertent household
errors.60 Some antifraud units depend
on these claim retentions to support their
budgets. During the 1980s and 1990s,
most states incurred large quality-control penalties that Food and Nutrition
Service allowed the states to “reinvest” in
activities designed to improve program
integrity. Reinvestment moneys ordinarily cannot pay the salaries of regular state
employees, but antifraud units have
proven effective at getting these funds
spent to support their activities.
Although the need for strong, effective
antifraud enforcement is unassailable,
advocates may and should question inappropriate spending in the name of fraud
prevention and detection.
A. Questioning Wasteful,
Stigmatizing Practices

Some states (notably Ohio) have spent
significant amounts of program or reinvestment funds on bus signs, movie theater ads, and other widely disseminated
advertising calling attention to food
stamp fraud and encouraging people to
report suspected instances. These materials certainly give the public the impression that food stamp fraud is widespread.
Whether they accomplish anything
meaningful in identifying actual cases of
fraud is far less clear, however. Most
members of the general public are in no
position to report food stamp fraud
because they do not know what a household may have told its eligibility worker
or what the program’s eligibility rules
are. Many people probably believe that
receiving food stamps while one is

55This right exists directly under 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(3)(iii)(I) and by cross-reference under id. § 273.16(f)(1)(iii).
56Id. §§ 273.16(a)(1), (e)(3)(iii)(I), (f)(1)(iii).
577 U.S.C. §§ 2019, 2024(d) (2000).
58Id. § 2025(c).
59Id. § 2025(a).
60Id.
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employed is fraudulent—even though 38 for IPVs has a conflict of interest that is
percent of food stamp recipients live in a likely to make the individual less responsive to the explanations that innocent
household with at least one earner.
claimants may offer. These payments
The effectiveness of these broad-scale reward investigators for doing only one
campaigns is speculative at best. Absent part of their job—winning disqualificaevidence that these are effective and effi- tions—and ignore another, equally imporcient means of program administration, tant aspect—exonerating innocent
their costs may not be eligible for federal claimants. As such, these arrangements
financial participation and may not be violate the Food Stamp Act’s “fair service”
included in reinvestment plans.61
requirements.62 They also violate the
Act’s command that “[t]he officials
B. Prohibiting Improper Personal
responsible for making determinations of
Incentives for Individuals
ineligibility under this Act shall not
Pursuing Fraud Cases
receive or benefit from revenues retained
Georgia’s food stamp agency has had con- by the State under the provisions of this
tractual arrangements with many county subsection.”63 Moreover, paying fixed
prosecutors to provide bounties of a certain bounties for disqualifications rather than
amount for each claimant whom prosecu- reimbursing actual costs violates the Food
tors disqualify from the Food Stamp Stamp Act’s general limitations on activiProgram. This funding may be critical to ties eligible for federal financial participapreserving the jobs of some junior prosecu- tion.64 Although some may find bounties
tors, who are precisely the people responsi- appealing in this particular case, providble for pressuring claimants into accepting ing a federal match for the payments
disqualification through waivers, consents opens the program to widespread finanto disqualifications, or fee bargains. Other cial abuse. States should not tie funding
states reportedly tie the funding of their for any person involved with fraud investiantifraud units, and hence the jobs of the gations, prosecutions, or disqualifications
investigators working there, to the state- to the number of claimants disqualified or
retained share of collections of IPV claims. the amounts of the resulting claims.
In times of state and local financial crises
and a generally weak employment market, Author’s Acknowledgments
these incentives are likely to be particularly powerful. Naturally any individual I appreciate the comments of Stacy Dean,
whose personal financial security depends Louise Hayes, Colleen Pawling, Dottie
upon the number of people disqualified Rosenbaum, and Sandra Young.

61See 7 C.F.R. § 276.1(a)(4) (2004) (describing reinvestment as alternative to payment of sanctions).
627 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
63Id. § 2025(a).
64Id. § 2025(a).
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